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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-22(3)(j) and (4), and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Annotated (1993).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial because of a

juror, who after being questioned on voir dire whether he had read any articles on tort
reform and responding negatively, recalled after the jury was impaneled that he had read
such an article.
Standard of Review. To obtain a new trial, a party must first demonstrate that
a juror failed to answer honestly a voir dire question, and then further show that a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. State v. Thomas. 830
P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) and State v. Thomas. 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989), relying on
McDonough Power Equip.. Inc. v. Greenwood. 464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845 (1984).l
Whether the trial court should have excused a juror for cause is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Lacey. 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial when the

jury's verdict was allegedly inconsistent and whether there is sufficient evidence to support
the verdict.

Plaintiff in her Brief states an irrelevant standard of review. Plaintiff admits that Judge
Harding appreciated the policies articulated in Barrett v. Peterson. 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) and Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1992), when the court allowed plaintiff to submit voir dire questions regarding tort
reform. See Plaintiffs Brief at 9. Accordingly, the voir dire questions are not at issue.
1

Standard of Review. The issue as stated by Plaintiff actually raises two
standards of review. Plaintiff correctly states that a denial of a motion for a new trial based
upon insufficiency of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hansen v.
Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). The reviewing court presumes the proper exercise of
discretion unless the record clearly shows to the contrary. Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P.2d
530 (Utah 1984).
When the answers to the special verdict appear inconsistent, however, the
courts will seek to reconcile the answers if at all possible, rather than presume inconsistency.
Accordingly, the standard of review is clearly erroneous. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson
Const. Co.. 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in regard to foundational objections during

Defendant's examination of Defendant's expert witness and whether the trial court erred in
regard to foundational objections while Plaintiff was examining Plaintiffs expert witness.
Standard of Review. A trial court possesses discretion as to the
appropriateness of expert testimony in a specific case and whether proper foundation has
been laid; that determination will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.
State v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
4.

Whether Plaintiff was denied a fair trial when defense counsel in his

closing argument argued that if the jury had been at the accident scene the night of the
accident, or went there subsequent thereto under like circumstances, they could have
appreciated that Defendant's vision was limited due to darkness.

2

Standard of Review. Because counsel have considerable latitude in their
closing arguments, improper comments by counsel warrant reversal only if the appellate
court concludes that in the absence of the improper argument, there was a reasonable
likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the Plaintiff. State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221
(Utah 1989).2
5,

Whether the errors complained of by the Plaintiff were such that the

Plaintiff was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of any such errors.
Standard of Review. In order to warrant a new trial based upon the argument
that the cumulative effect of substantially harmless errors deprived Plaintiff of a fair trial, the
alleged errors must undermine the appellate court's confidence that Plaintiff was able to
present to the jury her theory of the case and that a fair trial was had. Whitehead v.
American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59 are determinative in this appeal
because Plaintiff is appealing pursuant thereto, and accordingly those rules are reproduced in
their entirety in Appendix A.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In order to obtain a new trial based upon the belated revelations of a juror to a
voir dire question, a party must first demonstrate that the juror failed to answer honestly a
voir dire question, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid

2

Plaintiff s stated standard of review for this issue is irrelevant as the issue surrounds not
the admissibility of evidence, but comments made during closing arguments and whether such
comments were improper.
3

basis for a challenge for cause. In this case, the record reflects that the juror was completely
forthcoming, but that a single and insignificant article had escaped his attention. In fact, the
juror stated that he did not remember enough of the article to really give the court any facts
about it. Counter to the assertions of Plaintiff, Plaintiffs counsel was allowed to ask
additional questions, and was not confined by the court in his examination of the juror.
Plaintiff never moved that the juror be excused for cause. Plaintiffs only claim is that had
the juror answered the voir dire questions more completely before the jury was impaneled,
Plaintiff would have exercised a peremptory challenge. Under established law, without a
showing that the juror should have been removed for cause, no error occurred. Because
Plaintiff made no motion to have the juror removed for cause at the trial level, and because
Plaintiff cannot meet the two prong test of McDonough Power Equip.. Inc. v. Greenwood.
464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845 (1984), no error can be predicated on the trial court's actions
concerning the juror.
Plaintiff erroneously claims that the jury verdict is inconsistent because the
jury found Defendant negligent, but not a proximate cause of the accident. Well established
law, as well as common sense, indicates that such a result is possible, especially where a
special verdict form asks the jury to make both findings as to negligence and proximate
cause. The court must reconcile the answers of the special verdict form if at all possible. In
this case, the answers on the special verdict form are easily reconcilable, and for this reason,
there exists no error.
Plaintiff also claims that the evidence does not support the verdict. Plaintiff
has completely failed to marshal the evidence as required in order to challenge the

4

sufficiency of the evidence. In any event, a conscientious review of the record shows
abundant evidence and numerous bases to conclude that Plaintiff was negligent and the sole
proximate cause of the accident. There is evidence for the jury to believe that Plaintiff was
travelling too fast for conditions, that Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper look-out, that
Plaintiff failed to keep her vehicle under proper control, and that Plaintiff failed to stop her
vehicle when she possessed the ability to do so. These bases upon which the jury could have
found Plaintiff negligent are over and above Plaintiffs negligence which was directed by the
court because Plaintiff failed to attach a headlamp on her bicycle in violation of law.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's counsel's closing argument was improper and
denied Plaintiff a fair trial. Plaintiff asserts that counsel for Defendant urged the jurors to
visit the accident scene. A review of the record indicates that counsel for Defendant did not,
in fact, urge the jurors to visit the accident scene, but only in hypothetical terms stated that if
the jurors went to the accident scene under the same circumstances that existed the night of
the accident, they too would see that Defendant's vision of Plaintiff was diminished due to
darkness and headlights coming from the opposite direction.
Counsel's closing arguments may appropriately go beyond the evidence to the
extent of any reasonable inference or deduction therefrom. Defendant believed that
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented by Defendant and Mr. Newell Knight,
coupled with the fact that in order to make the scene look bright, Plaintiffs expert had to use
a polarizing lens and take numerous exposures at different settings, could lead the jury to the
conclusion that had they been there the night of the accident, they would have had trouble
seeing Plaintiff.

5

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling as to the testimony of
both Plaintiff and Defendant's expert accident reconstruction witnesses. Plaintiff discusses
no specific objections, discusses no specific rulings of the court, but only makes broad
statements referring the court to the record. Without proper citation or analysis, Plaintiff
concludes that the trial court hindered the proper assessment of the expert's qualifications and
opinions and skewed the jury's perception of the facts assessed by the experts. A review of
the record, however, shows Plaintiffs conclusion, as well as her cursory review of the
record, to be in error.
Since Plaintiff has not pointed to exactly which ruling or rulings it considered
error, Defendant is compelled to address almost every objection made within the pages cited
by the Plaintiff on page 18 of her Brief. Because Plaintiff has completely failed to brief the
matter adequately, this court should not consider it. Nonetheless, Defendant has fully briefed
the issue and has presented analysis concerning almost every ruling made within the pages
cited by Plaintiff. A review of these rulings shows the court not only ruled properly in the
circumstances, but was equitable in its decisions in that it limited or permitted both accident
reconstructionists to either comment on or be refrained from commenting on similar matters.
A thorough review of the record, as well as the applicable law, indicates that
no error occurred in this trial. Where no error occurred, cumulative effect of error cannot
be found. Plaintiff was not denied a fair trial, but simply failed to persuade the jury of her
case.

6

ARGUMENT
I, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL
BASED ON A JUROR'S BELATED REVELATIONS
During the voir dire process, the prospective jurors were asked numerous
questions, some of which attempted to ferret out juror bias which may have existed due to
media sensationalism of tort reform and a perceived insurance crisis. Plaintiff does not
assign error to the questions asked nor to the manner in which those questions were asked.
Plaintiff does assign error, however, to the fact that the court did not grant Plaintiff a new
trial after a juror, Mr. Branscomb, remembered only after the jury was impaneled that he
had read a single article regarding tort reform. Plaintiff, however, did not move that juror
Branscomb be removed for cause.
The record indicates that the juror stated in pertinent part:
I just remember an article, I think, in the Readers Digest in the last 18
months, roughly. It seems like it was on the — I thought of this as I was
driving up the road towards my office - on the number of lawsuits. And it
was a major — there was a major increase of lawsuits in the last few years. It
was, of course, on the negative side of the number. That's about the gist of
what I remember. As soon as I thought of that, I called back on my car phone
and I said I didn't think of that. And [the judge] asked something almost to
that statement, anything of an article we might have seen. And I thought I
better be calling [the judge] and letting [the court] know. That's about all I
remember.
R. 279 (Vol. I), p. 57. In response to this juror's explanation, the court delved further into
any bias that might be present. When asked whether reading the article would influence the
juror, he stated:
Oh, I don't think so. I don't remember enough of it to really give you any
exacts about it. Obviously, it makes you stop and think a little bit, because
that's what the article was about. But I don't think so.
7

Id. After asking a few more questions, the court turned to counsel and asked them if they
had any more questions. Counsel for Defendant felt that since the juror had been asked if
Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, could the juror award her a fair verdict, that the court
should also ask the question in the converse; that being, if the evidence does not warrant a
verdict for Plaintiff, could the juror find for Defendant. IdL at 58-59.
Thereafter, Mr. Sutterfield, counsel for Plaintiff, was given the opportunity to
question juror Branscomb. Mr. Sutterfield asked if the juror had read any other articles, to
which the juror answered no. Mr. Sutterfield then inquired as to whether the juror had any
personal views on the subject of tort reform or the number of lawsuits. The juror responded:
"I mean I look at each situation on its own merits." Ich at 60.
Reviewing the conversation in chambers and the totality of the voir dire
process, Plaintiff was given ample opportunity to investigate whether this juror had biases
that would rise to the level of cause. In contrast to the assertions made in Plaintiffs Brief,3
Plaintiffs counsel was allowed to ask additional questions and was not confined by the court.
R. 279 (Vol. I), p. 60. Plaintiffs counsel did not indicate that he had any more questions.
Plaintiffs counsel's only remark thereafter was that he wished Mr. Branscomb had made his
comments in the presence of the jury so as to prick the remembrances of other jurors.
However, for the purposes of this appeal, whether Mr. Branscomb answered voir dire
questions in chambers or in the presence of the other jury members is irrelevant. At no
point did Plaintiffs counsel move that the juror be dismissed for cause. Most likely,
Plaintiffs counsel realized that there was no basis to remove juror Branscomb for cause.

3

See Plaintiffs Brief at 11.
8

Plaintiff admits that the trial court appreciated the policy behind submitting
voir dire questions regarding tort reform. See Plaintiffs Brief at 9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
recitation of case law allowing voir dire on matters concerning tort reform and the perceived
insurance crisis has little relevance in the present appeal. Plaintiff asserts that those cases
are somehow controlling because the trial court forbade proper examination of Mr.
Branscomb. The examination of Mr. Branscomb, heretofore quoted, exhibits that this is not
the case. The court, Defendant's counsel, and Plaintiffs counsel all asked additional
questions of Mr. Branscomb.
Plaintiff further asserts that the court asked a series of questions, not to expose
bias, but to rehabilitate the juror. Plaintiff seems to insinuate that the court asked only
leading questions, not eliciting any further revelation of the juror. Plaintiff only quotes the
court's questions, omitting the answers thereto. However, as the answers quoted by the
Defendant, supra, indicate, juror Branscomb answered the questions forthrightly, honestly,
and exhibited an extremely unbiased nature.
Plaintiff claims that the form of the trial court's questions was similar to the
form of questions used by the trial court in Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460 (Utah 1991), cert,
denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), which the Plaintiff asserts were deemed inappropriate on
appeal. See Plaintiffs Brief at 11. Interestingly, the court in Evans found that no abuse of
discretion had occurred. Evans. 824 P.2d at 467. In fact, the court commented: "The
failure to ask an appropriate question on voir dire does not always constitute an abuse of
discretion requiring reversal." IdL The court went on to conclude that an examination of the
totality of the questioning led the court to believe that the trial court did not abuse its

9

discretion in conducting voir dire. In the case at bar, a complete review of the examination
of the jurors during voir dire in the court room, and that conducted in chambers specifically
with juror Branscomb, shows that the court did not abuse its discretion in any manner.
Plaintiffs main contention seems to be that had the juror answered the voir
dire questions more completely prior to the jury being impaneled, that Plaintiffs attorney
would have exercised a peremptory challenge. Plaintiff claims that the fact that she was
precluded from exercising a peremptory challenge mandates reversal. Both Utah and
national jurisprudence provide otherwise. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this very
question in McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood. 464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845
(1984). In McDonough. plaintiffs son was injured when his foot was caught under the deck
of a riding mower. Plaintiffs lost at the trial level and were granted a new trial by the trial
court on the basis that a juror had failed to answer a voir dire question correctly and that a
correct answer may have given rise to the use of peremptory challenge against him. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed.
The relevant voir dire question in McDonough was:
Now, how many of you have yourself or any members of your family
sustained any severe injury, not necessarily as severe as Billy, but sustained
any injuries whether it was an accident at home, or on the farm, or at work
that resulted in any disability or prolonged pain and suffering, that is you or
any members of your immediate family?
McDonough. 464 U.S. at 550, 104 S. Ct. at 847. It was shown in McDonough that the
juror in question had a son that was injured in the knee as a result of a tire explosion. The
juror did not reveal this fact until after the trial. The juror stated that his non-disclosure was
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not intentional and that his son's injury in no way affected his determination of the merits of
the case.
The United States Supreme Court held that the juror's admission was not
prejudicial and that therefore the order of the trial court should be overturned. In so
holding, the Court delineated a two prong test for determining whether the juror's nondisclosure had violated the parties' rights to a fair and impartial jury.
We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir
dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a
valid basis for a challenge for cause.
IcL 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S. Ct. at 850 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has
recognized the two prong test set forth in McDonough in two recent decisions concerning the
same case. State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) and State v. Thomas. 777 P.2d 445
(Utah 1989). In the later of the two Utah cases, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed:
In our prior opinion in this case, we specifically directed the trial court to hold
an evidentiary hearing and make a factual determination as to whether
defendant was entitled to a new trial under the test adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in [McDonough].
Thomas. 830 P.2d at 245.
In this case, Plaintiff cannot meet either of the two prongs of the test set forth
in McDonough. Plaintiff correctly stated that it is well settled that a party may not be
compelled to use a peremptory challenge when a challenge for cause would be appropriate.
See Plaintiffs Brief at 12, n.2, citing Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981). As in
McDonough and Thomas, the Jenkins case emphasizes that in order for any error to be
found, the appellate court must find that the juror should have been stricken for cause. The
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court in Jenkins did, however, comment on the discretion to be afforded to the trial court in
the impaneling of a jury.
In selecting a panel of jurors who are fair and impartial, some deference must
be accorded the discretion of the trial court. [Citations omitted]. Due
consideration should be given to the trial judge's somewhat advantaged
position in determining which persons would be fair and impartial jurors....
Jenkins. 627 P.2d at 536. All indications from the record indicate juror Branscomb
answered honestly, but after reflection decided he had perhaps not been as thorough in his
recollection as he could have been. There is no shred of evidence within the record which
shows any dishonesty on the part of the juror. He simply did not think of the single article
at the original voir dire. Plaintiff has completely failed both at the trial level and in her brief
to show that the juror should have been challenged for cause.
Only "strong and deep impressions" on the part of a venireman, however,
serve as a basis for disqualification for cause. The question of degree of
partiality (or "impressions") remains largely within the discretion of the trial
court.
State v. Lacey. 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983). In Lacey. a juror knew both a testifying
doctor and one of the investigating officers. When pressed, the juror admitted there was a
possibility he might attach more credibility to the witnesses he knew than to other persons he
did not know. The juror said, however, that he did not believe it would influence his
determination of the case. The trial court concluded that the juror's impressions of the
witnesses were not so "strong and deep" as to constitute bias. The Utah Supreme Court
found no error. IcL
In a similar situation in Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980)
(overruled on other grounds by Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993)), the Utah

12

Supreme Court was faced with facts where a relationship existed between a juror and defense
counsel. The plaintiff claimed that he did not know of the relationship until after the trial.
As this information did not come to the attention of the court until after the trial, plaintiff
claimed that plaintiffs right to voir dire was improperly curtailed, "resulting in an inadequate
opportunity to challenge [the juror] either for cause or peremptorily." IcL at 835. The
plaintiff therefore asserted that he was denied the right of full information in selective
processes in jury selection and therefore denied a trial by an impartial jury. The Utah
Supreme Court disagreed. The court held:
A trial court may order a new trial should it appear that juror bias crept into
the proceedings notwithstanding voir dire questioning. This is not to say,
however, that it is incumbent upon a trial court to order a new trial whenever
information is revealed which was not discovered by voir dire questioning
addressed thereto. It is impartial jury trial, not complete voir dire questioning,
that is the ultimate right involved. Where, in the sound discreti n of the trial
court, an infraction of the latter has no material impact upon the former, no
prejudicial error has occurred.
Id. No evidence exists, and Plaintiff has not even argued, that juror bias was in any way
involved in these proceedings. Because Plaintiff made no motion to have the juror removed
at the trial level for cause, and because Plaintiff cannot meet the two prong test set forth in
McDonough, no error can be predicated on the trial court's actions in regard to juror
Branscomb.
II. THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM AS ANSWERED BY THE JURY
IS CONSISTENT AND THERE EXISTS ABUNDANT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
Defendant has accepted Plaintiffs statement of the case and statement of the
facts. The facts which are important for a determination of this appeal include that Plaintiff
was headed downhill in an easterly direction traveling at a high speed. Plaintiffs speed was
13

estimated as high as 20 miles per hour. It was undisputed at trial that it was dark and that
Plaintiff did not have a headlamp on her bicycle as required by law. Defendant was
proceeding from the opposite direction heading west and attempted to make a left turn into a
parking lot. When Defendant attempted this left turn, Plaintiff and Defendant's vehicles
collided. There was evidence presented at trial that there was a vehicle behind Plaintiff with
its headlights on. The driver of that vehicle, the Dunaway vehicle, believed that Plaintiff had
enough time to avoid the accident. Through expert testimony, evidence was received that the
human eye is attracted towards light and that due to the totality of the circumstances at the
accident scene, Defendant may not have been able to see Plaintiff. All aspects of both
liability and damages were disputed at trial. Defendant maintained that Plaintiff was the sole
proximate cause of any injuries she suffered and that the great majority of her injuries were
not in any way related to the accident at issue.
A. The Jury Verdict is Consistent. Utah law is abundantly clear and well established that:
"Where the possibility that inconsistency in jury interrogatories or special verdicts exists, the
courts will not presume inconsistency; rather, they will seek to reconcile the answers if •
possible." Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co.. 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985).4 In
Weber Basin Water Cons. Dist. v. Nelson. 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960), the court
held:
The jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve in part or in whole the testimony
of the two appraisers. Regardless of how arrived at, the jury chose the

4

Bennion was followed in Powell Div. of Dow Chemical v. Del-Rio P.P.. 761 P.2d 1380
(Utah 1988) and preceded in courts stating the same rule: Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hardware Co.. 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981); Weber Basin Water Cons. Pist. v. Nelson. 11 Utah
2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (Utah 1960); Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952).
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"before" value of the plaintiffs appraiser and the "after" value of the
defendants' appraiser. Presumptions and intendments cannot be indulged in to
establish a contradiction or inconsistency in the findings or answers of a jury
to special interrogatories, the presumption being always to the contrary. And
this court cannot go behind the answers and analyze or speculate as to the
process by which the jury arrived at them.
Id, 11 Utah 2d at 255, 358 P.2d at 83.
The only arguments that Plaintiff makes in order to show inconsistency in the
verdict are primarily guesses as to what the jury may have thought or concluded. While
Plaintiff did state at the time of trial that she perceived that the jury's verdict was
inconsistent, no inconsistency can be shown. Plaintiff never objected to the special verdict
form. Plaintiff places her entire analysis and argument on the point that the jury found the
Plaintiff to be negligent, but did not go on to answer whether she was the proximate cause of
the accident. Plaintiffs argument is a red herring. It was not the jury that found Plaintiff to
be negligent; that answer was entered by directed verdict. Nothing in the jury form
instructed the jury that after answering special interrogatory number two that they were to
continue on and state whether Plaintiff was the proximate cause of the accident. When
Plaintiffs counsel expressed concern that the verdict was inconsistent, the jury was removed
from the courtroom and the court reviewed the verdict with counsel. The court stated:
Actually, counsel, they've answered the verdict just as the court has instructed.
I've indicated if they answer either question number one or number two "no,"
they're to go no further. And that's what they did.
R. 281 (Vol. Ill), pg 427. As stated, Plaintiff did not object to the form of the special
verdict. Therefore, she cannot ascribe error to its form. The jury did follow the verdict
form, in that when they answered question number two "no," they stopped. There was no
error.
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Plaintiff finds it significant that the jury found Defendant negligent, but not the
proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff believes this is somehow incongruous. However,
there is nothing inconsistent about finding a party negligent, but not a proximate cause of an
injury. In Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co.. 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), the jury
was asked on a special verdict form whether the plaintiffs were negligent, whether they were
a proximate cause of the damage, and whether they were simply a cause of the damage. In
Bennion. the jury answered affirmatively that the plaintiffs were negligent and were a cause
of the damages, but found that the plaintiffs were not a proximate cause of the damage. The
court in Bennion held:
Certainly there is no inconsistency necessary or otherwise, between findings of
negligence and no proximate cause. [Citations omitted]. Nor was the jury's
answer to interrogatory 5(b), that plaintiffs were not a proximate cause of the
damage, inconsistent with the answer to 7(b), that plaintiffs were "a cause" of
the damage. Proximate cause is a legal construct calling for a legal conclusion
based on various factors in addition to an actual cause-effect relationship. It is
common place in the law that an act, omission, or force may be an actual
cause, but not a proximate cause. Since the jury may well have so found, we
cannot conclude that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency.
IdL at 1083.

Plaintiff argues that by finding Defendant negligent, the jury implicitly found
that Plaintiff was visible. The record does not support this conclusion. The jury may well
have believed that Defendant should have looked more conscientiously in the direction of
Plaintiff, or should have been otherwise more cautious. Plaintiff also states that:
Thus, though she may have been negligent for failing to use the headlamp, that
negligence could not have been the proximate cause of her injuries. There
must have been some other negligence on which her injuries could be
predicated, but no evidence to support such negligence was adduced at trial.
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See Plaintiffs Brief at 15. This statement highlights Plaintiffs failure to marshal the
evidence.5 There was ample evidence for the jury to find that not only was Plaintiff
negligent in failing to use the headlamp, but that she also failed to use a proper look-out, was
travelling too fast for conditions, and that she could have stopped had she exercised due care.
Plaintiff attempts to rally her argument around the assertion that the jury must have found
that Plaintiff was visible. Again, the evidence does not clearly preponderate in Plaintiffs
favor, but more easily preponderates in Defendant's favor. Since it was dark, and the cars
all had their lights on, a point which is undisputed, the cars were more easily visible than the
bicyclist. Therefore, Defendant's car was visible to Plaintiff, but Plaintiff was not
necessarily visible to Defendant. Neither Plaintiff nor the court knows exactly what the jury
was thinking, and it is impermissible for the court to opine what the jury might have
concluded. Weber Basin, 11 Utah 2d at 255, 358 P.2d at 83. Such deduction is pure
speculation.
Plaintiff concludes that because the jury did not state the basis upon which
Plaintiff may have been negligent or how that negligence proximately caused her injuries,
Defendant must have been the proximate cause of them. See Plaintiffs Brief at 16. This
conclusion simply does not follow from the evidence and is irrelevant in any event to the
present appeal. As cited, appellate courts are not to speculate through the lack of a statement
from the jury what the jury was thinking. The fact that the jury did not state the basis upon
which Plaintiff may have been negligent does not mandate a new trial. The jury was
instructed to follow the directions of the special verdict form, which the jury did. While

5

Plaintiff s failure to marshal the evidence is discussed more fully, infra, p. 18.
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Plaintiff maintains that hers is the only sensible interpretation of the jury's special verdict,
common sense indicates that the verdict is completely consistent.
B. The Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The Verdict, Plaintiff claims there was
insufficient evidence to support the verdict that Defendant was negligent, but not the
proximate cause of the accident. It is well established in Utah jurisprudence that the question
of proximate cause is left to the jury. E.g.. Godesky v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541
(Utah 1984). In this case, the jury could have found that the bicyclist had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident, and therefore was the proximate cause thereof. Simply because
Defendant may have been a "cause" of the accident, does not mean he was the proximate
cause. In any event, Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence as required by the appellate
courts. Plaintiff claims that she has cited all transcript portions and relevant jury instructions
in order for the court to determine the relative fault of the parties. In this regard, the
Plaintiff claims she has satisfied the marshaling requirement.
Plaintiff cites Judge Bench's dissenting opinion in Jenkins v. Weis. 230 Utah
Adv. Rep. 25, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that where there is no evidence
to support a verdict, there is no need to marshal the evidence. In this case, there is ample
evidence to support the verdict, and therefore Plaintiffs failure to marshal should preclude
the appellate court from reviewing the question. Plaintiff has not followed the court's
instructions as laid out in West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991), and more recently restated in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage &
Warehouse. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) wherein the court stated:
[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the
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[marshaling] duty... the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists.
Id. Thereafter, the appellant must show that the verdict is so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of evidence, thus making the verdict clearly erroneous. Id. The
court noted that this standard reflects that the appellate courts do not sit to re-try cases and
will refuse to consider the merits of challenges if the evidence is not marshalled.
As stated, Defendant argued at trial and the evidence reflects that Plaintiff was
negligent in failing to use a headlamp on her bicycle, that she failed to exercise proper
lookout, was travelling too fast for conditions, and could have stopped had she exercised due
care. The jury's verdict indicates a finding that Plaintiff could see Defendant and had time
to avoid the accident. Although expert testimony substantiated the same, even common sense
supports the conclusion that if Defendant could see Plaintiff, as Plaintiff argues, then Plaintiff
could see Defendant.
While Defendant recognizes that the doctrine of last clear chance as a distinct
tort doctrine was extinguished by the Comparative Negligence Act of Utah, the :ury could
still find that where Plaintiff had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, she may be the
only proximate cause of the accident. Utah law holds that arguments to the jury as to
whether a party may or may not have had the last clear chance to avoid injuries is not
precluded, but becomes just one of many factors to be weighed by the jury. Dixon v.
Stewart. 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). The jury was specifically instructed on proximate
cause. R. 212. The proximate cause instruction stated:
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence produces the injury, and without which the result would
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not have occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in
operation the factors that accomplish the injury. It may operate directly or
through intermediate agencies or through conditions created by such agencies.
The jury was also instructed where one has the right-of-way, that fact does not excuse that
person from exercising ordinary care to avoid an accident. R. 214. Also, the jury was
instructed that any person operating a vehicle or bicycle on public roadway must keep a
proper lookout. R. 217. The jury was further instructed that in addition to a proper lookout, every person must observe due care to keep their vehicle under reasonably safe and
proper control and to drive at such speeds as are safe and reasonably prudent under the
circumstances, having due regard to the conditions of the road, visibility, whether it is night
time or day time, and any actual potential hazards then existing, including other vehicles. R.
218. The issues of negligence and proximate cause were divided for the jury on the special
verdict form. It would be absurd to argue that proximate cause naturally flows from a
finding of negligence where the jury is given a separate question on the matter and is
separately instructed. There is abundant evidence which shows that the Plaintiff herself was
negligent and that this negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries.
C. Evidence Supporting the Jury's Finding that Defendant Was Not a Proximate Cause
of the Accident, The evidence at trial indicated the accident scene was dark. R. 280 (Vol.
II), p. 141, 158. Defendant testified that although he looked carefully towards the direction
of the Plaintiff, he saw nothing. IdL at 146. The road where the accident occurred was dry.
Id, at 158.
As Plaintiff was coming down the hill, she noticed the Defendant's car coming
towards her. IcL at 178. Plaintiff testified she saw the Defendant start to initiate his turn.
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Id. at 180. Plaintiff further testified that she was not looking in any other direction, but only
watching the Defendant come up the street and pull into the turning lane, and even saw him
proceed to turn. Id^ at 181. Plaintiff stated she was traveling as fast as 20 miles an hour.
Id. at 182. Plaintiff observed Defendant's vehicle long enough that she could make a fair
estimate of speed. Id. at 219.
Plaintiff testified that when she was traveling down the hill she was already
braking and that in fact both hands were on the brakes so that as she realized any danger was
present all she had to do was squeeze harder. LI at 219-20. Plaintiff admitted that she was
traveling at a speed which made it extremely difficult for her to stop in time to avoid the
impact. 14. at 221. Plaintiff admitted that had she been traveling more slowly she would
have had an easier time stopping. IcL at 222.
An objective witness, Ms. Dunaway, testified that from her position behind
Plaintiff she could assess what was going to happen and that if Plaintiff did not stop she was
going to get hit. IdL at 251. Ms. Dunaway said that from her position on top of the hill she
could see Defendant signaling to turn. IcL Ms. Dunaway testified further: "I could see her
going very fast down the hill." IcL at 252. Ms. Dunaway stated: "When I was first aware
the accident was about to happen, I did not honk because I felt she [Plaintiff] had time, and
she assessed the same thing I had assessed, to not--to take the evasive action." Id. at 258.
Plaintiffs expert, Mr. DuVal, admitted that he used a polarizing lens in
obtaining the pictures which were submitted at trial. IcL at 295. Mr. DuVal acknowledged
that polarizing lenses take the glare that might come from headlights out of the picture. 14
at 296. Mr. DuVal admitted that what is safe under a particular situation is not necessarily
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so under all circumstances. Id. at 324. Mr. DuVal admitted that by having her hands
already on the brakes, Plaintiffs reaction time would be reduced. IcL at 325. Mr. DuVal
further admitted that if the Plaintiff was outside the pool of light from the street light, one
could not see her. Mr. DuVal was asked: "There is a very definite edge when you get
outside of this edge. You can't see anything; is that correct?" Mr. DuVal's answer:
"That's correct." IdL at 332. Mr. DuVal acknowledged that there is no evidence that
Defendant's headlights actually shined on to Plaintiffs reflector on her bicycle, and that the
only reflector it could have reflected was a small reflector on the front of the Plaintiffs
handlebars. IcL at 342. Mr. DuVal admitted he did not know the meteorological conditions
that existed the night of the accident. IcL at 343. When asked whether, because of the
artificial lighting present at the accident scene, one may not necessarily recognize the
silhouette of a bicyclist going 20 miles an hour as a person in a position of danger, Mr.
DuVal answered: "It's very obvious in this case that that's what happened." Id. at 344.
Defendant's expert, Mr. Newell Knight, an accident reconstructionist, laid a
rather detailed foundation of his expertise in accident reconstruction. See testimony
commencing at R. 280 (Vol. II), 356. Mr. Knight stated that lighting can play a factor in
nighttime accidents, or any accident for that matter; he had studied lighting as a factor in his
formal education; and he has experience in dealing with cases where lighting is a factor. IdL
at 362. Mr. Knight testified as to the braking ability of a bicyclist, and indicated that a
bicycle's braking ability is not that much less than an automobile. IdL at 366. Admittedly,
Mr. DuVal opined the opposite, stating that a bike could not brake in a distance similar to an
automobile. Mr. Knight testified that the human eye looks for light, and therefore concluded
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that when Mr. Sharapata looked towards Plaintiffs direction, his eye was naturally drawn
towards the Dunaway vehicle behind the Plaintiff. Id. at 371. Mr. Knight, like Mr. DuVal,
testified that Plaintiffs reaction time would be much quicker since her hands were already on
the brakes. IdL at 374. (Note: there is an error in the pagination of the record. The
pages are enumerated to 376 and then begin again with 374. The previous citation and
the citation that follows are to the second pages of the record numbered 374 and 376.
Apparently, Plaintiff inadvertently excluded the second set of pages 374-376 from the
addendum of her brief). Finally, Mr. Knight testified that because of the distance between
Plaintiff and Defendant's vehicle when she knew or could have known that she was in
danger, Plaintiff had plenty of time to bring her bicycle to a stop. Id. at 376.
The foregoing is the evidence which Plaintiff should have marshaled. This
evidence shows that beyond Plaintiffs negligence for failing to use a head lamp on her
bicycle, the jury could have easily found or inferred that Plaintiff failed to exercise a proper
lookout, was traveling too fast for conditions, did not keep her bicycle under proper control,
and could have stopped had she exercised due and reasonable care. Accordingly, the jury
had abundant facts before it on which to base its decision that although Defendant was
negligent, it was Plaintiffs overwhelming negligence which was the proximate cause of her
injuries.
m . DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT WAS PROPER
AND IN ANY EVENT DID NOT PREJUDICE THE JURY
Plaintiff asserts that counsel for Defendant urged the jurors to visit the scene
of the accident, and that such urging constitutes grounds for a mistrial. See Plaintiffs Brief
at 17. A review of the record indicates that counsel for Defendant did not, in fact, urge the
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jurors to visit the scene, but only stated: "So you can go up there, and I suspect some of
you may have even done that on one of the nights of the trial." R. 283 (Vol. V), p. 3. This
statement cannot be construed as urging the jurors to visit the scene. Defense counsel did
not state or suggest that any member of the jury should go and visit the accident site, but
observed what they would have seen if they had. Counsel's argument did not rest on
inadmissable evidence. Defense counsel stated, "I suspect." No reasonable person could
construe counsel's remark as a statement on inadmissable evidence. Counsel for Defendant
simply argued that if any person, the jurors included, were to go to the accident scene at the
same time of year, the same time of evening, and under similar conditions as of the night of
accident, such a person would see that defense counsel's arguments in regards to the lighting
were accurate. Defense counsel's argument in this regard reflected a common sense
inference from the evidence which was admitted.
Even if counsel for Defendant had urged the jurors to visit the scene, such
comment would not constitute error.6 After closing arguments, the jury was sequestered for

6

See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 (Harmless Error). Indeed, in the case of Cawthra v.
City of Greeley. 391 P.2d 876 (Colo. 1964), the court was faced with facts where a juror had
visited an accident scene, not far from the court house, while on an errand unrelated to the case.
That juror returned for the jury deliberation and told the other jurors what he saw in a passing
glance. The court in Cawthra found it significant that the trial court did not by appropriate
order instruct the jury that they should not view the scene and that neither litigant had requested
an order preventing such viewing even though the accident scene was three blocks from the court
house. The court held: "Any misconduct on the part of [the juror] is in our view not such
'gross misconduct' as would warrant the necessity of a second trial. Actually when viewed in
context, this 'misconduct' is really quite minuscule, and readily distinguishable from the flagrant
misconduct [found in another case]." The court found that the case before it was controlled by
Ison v. Stewart. 94 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1939) wherein the court held that an unauthorized viewing
by a juror of an accident scene was an insufficient ground for the granting of a motion for a new
trial. "[I]t is well settled in most jurisdictions that the fact that one or more of the jurors in a
civil case made an unauthorized visit to the scene of the accident.. .involved is not in and of itself
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the deliberations, after which they brought forth a verdict. There was no opportunity
between closing arguments and the rendering of the verdict for the jurors to go and visit the
scene. No prejudice can be shown.
The rest of Defendant's closing argument, as cited by Plaintiff in alleging
error, is simply a hypothetical statement, not inviting the jury to base their decision on
inadmissable evidence, but arguing specifically that evidence which was before the jury.
Counsel for Defendant essentially stated that if the jury had been there that night, they would
have been able to ascertain that Defendant Sharapata could not see Plaintiff, or at least see
Plaintiff as well as Plaintiff claimed. Counsel's statement that the pictures submitted by
Plaintiff make it look like high noon in the Sierra, and that such pictures could only be
produced after careful photography, was substantiated by the evidence, where on cross
examination Plaintiffs expert Greg DuVal admitted that he used a polarizing lens in taking
the pictures to discount any possible glare. R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 296 and 335. Defendant's
counsel further argued that one does not have to be a genius to know one's eye does not see
like a camera lens. R. 283 (Vol. V), p.4. Such an appeal to the common sense of jurors
cannot be construed as error; it is simply argument. Counsel then stated, again
hypothetically, "if you went to the scene, you would not see that kind of contrast and
sharpness of the darkness. That's not fair to try and claim that was [Mr. Sharapata's] vision
at all." R. 283 (Vol. V), p. 4.

prejudicial in the absence of a showing that it influenced or effected the verdict." W.C. Crais
III, Prejudicial Effect of Unauthorized View by Jury in Civil Cases Scene of Accident or
Premises in Question. 11 A.L.R. 3d 918, 923 (1967).
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"Counsel for both sides have considerable latitude in their closing arguments.
They have the right to fully discuss from their perspectives the evidence and all inferences
and deductions it supports." State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). It can be
deducted and inferred from the evidence that had the jury been there the night of the
accident, they would have been just as unable to see Plaintiff as Defendant claimed at trial.
In Dibello. the court held that improper conduct regarding closing arguments warrants
reversal only "if the appellate court concludes that absent the improper argument, there was a
reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to [the other party]." Id. at 1225.
The court in Dibello was reviewing a criminal case. The Dibello court rested
its decision on prosecutorial misconduct in a criminal case relying primarily on a professional
rule of conduct applicable only to prosecutors, standards inapplicable to the present case.
The arguments of defense counsel in this case cannot conceivably lead to the
conclusion that had defense counsel not made this comment, the verdict would have been
different. A review of the record indicates that this error was not preserved for appeal. Any
objection thereto was belated. Had defense counsel's argument been overwhelmingly
objectionable, Plaintiffs attorney could have cured the matter by timely objecting to the
comment and asking the court to instruct the jury to disregard it. Plaintiff has forgone her
opportunity to cure the alleged problem, and should not be allowed on appeal to claim
reversible error thereon.
The prejudicial effect of defense counsel's single sentence is negligible. This
comment must be taken in the context of a lengthy and complex closing argument. In
addition, the court instructed the jury that they should not consider as evidence any statement
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of counsel made during the trial, which would include closing arguments. R. 228. The jury
was reminded that they were to decide the case solely upon the evidence that had been
received and from any inferences that may be drawn therefrom. R. 228. Both in Hall v.
Blackham. 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966) and State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 754
(Utah 1982), the appellants argued that opposing counsel made improper remarks during
closing arguments so as to warrant reversal. In both cases, the appellate court found that the
trial court's admonition to the jury that they were not to consider the statements by counsel,
but only to consider the evidence which was admitted in court, mitigated any error.
Specifically, in Creviston. the court held: "Finally, the court, in instruction number three,
cautioned the jury to consider only the evidence and to disregard 'any such utterance that has
no basis in the evidence.' We find no error." Creviston, 646 P.2d at 754. Likewise, in this
case, the jury was properly instructed that the comments of counsel are not evidence.
IV, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN RULING ON
THE TESTIMONY CONCERNING BOTH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT'S
EXPERT ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION WITNESSES
A, Plaintiff Has Not Adequately Identified to What Ruling or Rulings She Assigns
Error. Nor Has Plaintiff Adequately Briefed the Matter,

Plaintiff in her Brief asserts

that she was: "improperly limited in his [sic] examination of her witness, and was
improperly limited in objecting to defendant's examination of his witness." See Plaintiffs
Brief at 17. Plaintiff discusses no specific objections, discusses no specific rulings of the
court, but only makes broad statements referring the appellate court to the record generally.
Such superficial briefing does not warrant an appellate review. State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (court declined to consider argument that was not adequately briefed).
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Without citation or analysis, Plaintiff concludes that the trial court hindered the proper
assessment of the experts qualifications and opinions and skewed the jury's perception of the
facts as assessed by the experts.
Plaintiff cites only a single case in her support. Whitehead v. American
Motor Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990). Whitehead is hardly comparable to this case.
Whitehead concerned a case where a defendant was severely restricted in his cross
examination where the plaintiff had "opened the door" on direct. Such is not the case here,
and to the extent that it is cited by Plaintiff, is inapplicable. In Whitehead, the court
discussed specific objections and found that they were wrongfully sustained. Here the court
cannot so find, since Plaintiff never discusses exactly what objections or sustaining she
believes are in error. Plaintiff only claims, citing numerous pages of the record, that the
trial court erred. A review of the record, however, shows Plaintiffs conclusion, as well as
her cursory review of the record, to be erroneous.
B. The Trial Court's Rulings Were Correctly Made, Because Plaintiff Failed to
Identify to Which Rulings She Assigned Error, Defendant is Compelled to Address
Almost Every Ruling, All of the objections to which Plaintiff is apparently assigning error
were made as to foundation. See Plaintiffs Brief at 18. "The determination of adequate
foundation is solely within the discretion of the trial court...." Tjas v. Proctor. 591 P.2d
438 (Utah 1979). A trial court's rulings on foundation are reviewed for abuse of
discretion.7 Since Plaintiff has not pointed to exactly which ruling she considers error,

7

Plaintiff asserts in her issues for review and standards of review that the trial court's rulings
were evidentiary in nature and are reviewed not only for an abuse of discretion, but ultimately
for legal correctness. Plaintiff cites State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991) in
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Defendant is compelled to address almost every objection made within the pages cited by
Plaintiff on page 18 of her Brief.
The first objection was found at R. 280 (Vol. II), page 267, wherein Plaintiffs
counsel was questioning his own accident reconstructionist, Greg DuVal.
Question:

What initial information were you given, Lieutenant?

Answer:

My recollection is I had a copy of the accident report. That's
basically what I had to begin with.

Question:

You had a short discussion with me about basic facts of the
case?

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

What was your first impression about the case?

Answer:

Well —

Mr. Peatross: Foundation, your Honor. I have no idea what kind of opinion
he can render with that type of question. There's no foundation
really for any opinions.
Mr. Sutterfield: I didn't ask for his opinion. I asked for his first impression.
Mr. Peatross: Then it's not relevant, your Honor.
The Court:

I'll sustain the objection.

support of this proposition. The rulings in the case at bar were not strictly evidentiary rulings,
but were rulings on foundation. The correct standard of review is for abuse of discretion only.
Tjas v. Proctor. 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979). In contrast, the Ramirez case had to do with the
admissibility of in-court and out-of-court identifications in a criminal case. In that case, the
court stated: "Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is question of law, and we always
review questions of law under a correctness standard." Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. In this
case, the admissibility of a piece of evidence was not at issue; at issue was whether the proper
foundation had been laid for an expert witness' testimony.
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Simply stating that one has read an accident report and has discussed the case
with an attorney is not enough foundation for an expert opinion or "impression" as to
reconstruction.
From Plaintiffs perfunctory argument, Plaintiff appears to specifically
question the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs expert, when not able to testify as to the
conditions present on the night of the accident, was prohibited from giving his opinion on
what Defendant saw immediately before the collision. See Plaintiffs Brief at 18. In fact,
Plaintiff even maintains, erroneously, that Plaintiff made the same objections to the testimony
of Defendant's expert, Mr. Newell Knight, and the court overruled them. A careful review
of the record shows the opposite; the trial court ruled consistently and equitably.
In Edwards v. Didericksen. 597 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah 1979), the court
stated:
The admissibility of accident reconstruction evidence depends in large measure
upon the foundation laid. The expertise of the witness, his degree of
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his opinion
and the facts adduced must be established.
The Utah Court of Appeals in Fisher v. Trapp. 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
sustained a trial court disallowing testimony of an accident reconstructionist as to whether a
certain driver was driving too fast and had an improper lookout.8 The court in Fisher
recited factually:
Trapp's attorney successfully objected, based on inadequate foundation,
claiming that Shupe, an accident reconstruction expert, had not testified as to

Subsequent case law has made such statements which not only embrace the ultimate issue,
but also make legal conclusions impermissible. Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
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the location on the road where Trapp could have seen Fisher and taken steps to
avoid the accident.
Fisher. 781 P.2d at 207. The next day, Shupe testified that he had returned to the scene of
the accident and made measurements and other observations whereupon the court, based on
that foundation, permitted Shupe to state that in his opinion Trapp was proceeding too fast
for conditions and had exercised an improper look-out. The Court of Appeals held that the
trial court correctly sustained the objection to Shupe's opinion on the first day of trial
because Shupe did not have the necessary degree of familiarity with the facts. Where on the
second day, when Shupe had acquired the requisite degree of familiarity and the judge
allowed the testimony, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, defense counsel's foundational objections almost exclusively
went to the point that since Plaintiffs expert was not at the scene in March of 1990 and was
not conversant with the meteorological conditions of that night, the expert could not compare
the exact lighting conditions of that night with any nights subsequent thereto. It is readily
apparent through a review of the record that plaintiffs counsel wanted to establish through
expert testimony exactly what the Defendant saw. Specifically, Plaintiffs counsel asked if
conditions had changed in terms of lighting between March of 1992 versus March of 1990.
Defense counsel objected as to foundation, since the accident reconstructionist was not there
in March of 1990. The court sustained the objection. R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 272.
While the case of Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920
(Utah 1990) is not supportive of Plaintiffs claimed error, it is illustrative of the criteria for
the evidence which the court would not allow in this case. In Whitehead, a party was trying
to have a crash test film admitted. The court in Whitehead stated:
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The criteria for establishing the admissibility of crash test films, such as those
in issue here, are that the data be relevant, that the tests be conducted under
conditions substantially similar to those of the actual occurrence, and that its
presentation not consume undue amounts of time, not confuse the issues, and
not mislead the jury.
Id. at 923. Those are exactly the concerns expressed by defense counsel in this case. Mr.
DuVal, Plaintiffs expert, was not at the scene at the time of the accident, and was not able
to testify that the conditions on his subsequent visits were substantially similar to those of the
actual occurrence. Fearing that such testimony would mislead the jury in the case at bar, the
trial court declined to admit such evidence.
The court in Whitehead proffered further:
The requirements of "substantial similarity of conditions" does not require
absolute identity; however, they must "be so nearly the same in substantial
particulars as to afford a fair comparison in respect to the particular issue to
which the test is directed."
IcL citing Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. Ishee. 317 So.2d 923, 926 (Miss. 1975). Plaintiffs
counsel was unable to lay the proper foundation, and Mr. DuVal was unable to testify that
the conditions within which he was working were substantially the same as the night in
question so as to help the jury to come to a correct decision. Accordingly, the court
properly ruled the testimony inadmissible.
Significantly, although this ruling was completely proper, even if it had not
been, it would have constituted only harmless error. As the record reflects, to the question
of whether conditions had changed, the witness answered "not to my knowledge." R. 280
(Vol. II), p. 272. The jury was not instructed to disregard the answer, therefore no error
can be predicated thereupon.
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Later, in Plaintiffs direct examination of Mr. DuVal, Plaintiffs attorney
asked Mr. DuVal:
Have you had an occasion to stop in the area where you think Mr. Sharapata
was, based upon what you reviewed, and look in the area and watch bicycles
come down after dark?
Answer:

Yes.

Mr. Peatross: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this. There's no
foundation that the conditions are even similar, much less the same at this
night, that he had the same opportunity to see; that he looked for the same
amount of time; that he had the same concerns or anything that happened to
John Sharapata at the time of this accident.
The Court:

I'm going to sustain the objection.

R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 279. In an attempt to lay further foundation, Plaintiffs counsel asked:
Based upon going up there in March of '92, and based upon the research that
you've done, did you reach a conclusion as to the lighting conditions at
approximately 7:00 to 7:15 on March of '90?
Answer:

Yes.

Question:

What is your conclusion in that regard?

Answer:

As far as the actual -

Mr. Peatross: Your Honor, again, there's just no foundation whatsoever for
what the conditions were in March of 1990.
Mr. Sutterfield: If that were the case, Judge, we could never
reconstruct anything.
Mr. Peatross: Some cases we can't.
Mr. Sutterfield: If it's dark in March 1990 The Court:

I think if you are going to do that, counsel, you've got to show
that you have the same meteorological conditions that existed
and same time, you know. I need to — I'll permit you to lay
those foundational things, but you're going to have to show he
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knows exactly the phase of the moon at that time, how much
difference — he went on a different day. In the spring you are
gaining many minutes of daylight per day. You're going to
have to establish it's exactly the same, or it's not going to come
in.
Id. at 280. No evidence had been admitted which established the lighting conditions on the
night of the accident. Like the court in Fisher v. Trapp. supra, the trial court in this case
did not allow the expert to render his testimony when his degree of familiarity with the
necessary facts and the logical nexus between his opinion and the facts was not well
established. At no point did Mr. DuVal testify that he knew what the meteorological
conditions were that night, that is relative to clouds or clear skies, or whether the moon was
even out. Plaintiffs expert did not indicate the review of any evidence to establish how long
after dark it was the day of the accident. The court, properly using common sense and
assuming facts that could be judicially noticed, indicated that in the spring many minutes of
daylight are gained per day.
Plaintiffs counsel persisted in attempting to elicit a conclusion from Mr.
DuVal as to the ability of Defendant to see Plaintiff. To some extent, Defendant's objections
thereto were overruled. Stating that Mr. DuVal had admitted that he did not know the
conditions at the time of the accident, defense counsel argued that no opinions could be
rendered thereon. R. 280 (Vol. II), p.281. Nonetheless, the court permitted Mr. DuVal to
testify. The court did, however, limit the testimony to the illumination from the light itself:
I think it's going to have to do with the illumination from the light itself that
exists, if that's the scope of it. If the scope of his answer is going to be the
illumination he observed from the light, the artificial light that's present, I'll
permit that.
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R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 281. Thereafter, the witness was allowed to render his opinion as to the
relative illumination from the light which was there both the day of the accident and when
the expert went to the accident scene.
In an attempt to reconstruct the accident, Plaintiffs counsel asked:
Have you had the occasion at dark on dry roads, without snow, to witness
bicycles going through the area without headlamps?
An objection as to foundation was made because, in the words of defense counsel:
He said he stood in the middle of the street, no traffic. And if he sees
something under the light, I have no problem or dispute that he did that and
could do that. But that's not the issue in this case.
The court sustained the objection. R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 285-86. The court, after arguments
of counsel, stated:
I don't see, counsel, that it's really that relevant as to what he observed,
unless he actually performed some type of recreation of the incident with the
same type of everything being constant, including the bicycle, the clothing and
so on. I don't think that's what you're telling us. I think what you're telling
me is what he's done is simply observed some bicycles. We can't tell if they
had the same type of bikes, reflectors, clothing. For that reason, I don't think
it's sufficiently similar to warrant the testimony in that regard.
The other observations he's made regarding the zone of light, the ability to see
objects, is perfectly permissible. But I think when you're talking about
anything, that tends to constitute some type of recreation of the accident. It
isn't relevant unless it's exactly the same.
Id. at 287-288. Plaintiffs attorney attempted on several more occasions to have his expert
render opinions as to the conditions on March 7th. See R. 280 (Vol. II), pp.290 and 298.
The court sustained Defendant's objection as to foundation. Plaintiff then asked the openended question:
Officer, have you made any other findings with respect to lighting conditions?
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Answer:

The lighting that we've discussed is what is there, plus vehicles.
The vehicles also illuminate what's in front of them, plus we
have the reflective device of the bicycle which is on the front that is in a position where its basically directly in front of the
Sharapata vehicle due to the layout. If we look at the diagram
just briefly for a moment, the colored photographs and the
diagram show that the left turn lane basically centers over the
eastbound double yellow line. With that, as we take the
Sharapata vehicle traveling within the left turn lane, that is the
area where the headlights shine forward, shine in an area on the
bicycle as it is coming through towards the vehicle. And so we
have that capability of the headlamps of the Sharapata vehicle to
illuminate the bicycle in such a way that the reflective device on
the front can be seen. The device will be seen--

R. 280 (Vol. II), pp. 299-300. An objection was made as to foundation as to whether the
bicycle was in the same area or whether the headlights actually illuminated the reflector.
Defense counsel noted that Mr. DuVal was not an eyewitness, and there was no evidence in
the record to support that the headlights of Defendant ever met with the reflective plate on
the front of Plaintiffs bike. Nonetheless, the court overruled Defendant's objection and
permitted the opinion to remain, commenting that any objection thereto would go to weight.9
R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 300. Plaintiffs counsel at R. 280 (Vol. II), page 320 asked:
What is your opinion with respect to what Sharapata could have seen at four
seconds or three seconds, two seconds, and at one second?

9

Defendant assumes that plaintiff is not making any allegations of error as to objections
which were sustained in the record, R. 280 (Vol. II), pages 299 and 322. For example,
plaintiffs counsel asked: "Are there other findings or conclusions that you've reached?"
Defendant objected, and the court sustained the objection, on the basis that such an open-ended
question can be answered with any answer. As Defendant objected, "He could throw out any
answer." R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 322.
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Defense counsel interjected that this was the same foundational problem that had faced the
court in many previous questions. There was not any foundation as to what Defendant,
under the conditions of the day of the accident, could have seen, other than his own
testimony. The court sustained the objection. The question was essentially answered,
nonetheless, later in the examination. R. 280 (Vol. II), pp. 321-22.
Later, Plaintiffs attorney asked his accident reconstructionist: "[W]hen was
the bicycle in the headlights of the Sharapata vehicle, at what points in time?" I i at 348.
To this, defense counsel objected indicating the court had ruled that there was no evidence
that Plaintiff was ever in Defendant's headlights. The Court stated:
I'm going to permit your question as to what the headlights would indicate, but
I'm not going to have him testify that the bicycle was in the headlights. He
doesn't know that.
Mr. Sutterfield: All right, that's fair.
The Court:

He can testify to the general dynamics.

Id. Interestingly, although Plaintiff claims to have suffered disparate treatment at the hands
of the judge, the record reflects that the judge made the exact same ruling as to the testimony
of Mr. Knight. When Defendant asked his expert witness whether he had an opinion
whether a pair of headlights coming towards Mr. Sharapata would have affected his ability to
see, Plaintiff's counsel objected:
I'll object on the basis of foundation, the fact he's made no attempt to
duplicate what Sharapata saw or didn't see. That's the same objection Mr.
Peatross had sustained half-a-dozen times.
The Court:

Well, and I'll sustain the objection to that form of the question.
But I will permit, again in the same context, the witness to
testify as to the general dynamics of what effect a light may or
may not have in the given situation, but not as a condition.
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R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 375. As this exchange illustrates, there was no disparate treatment, but
in fact the court was consistent. Plaintiffs attorney made other foundational objections,
which were sustained as well. See, e.g.. R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 369.10 It is disingenuous to
maintain that Defendant's examination of Mr. Knight was "unfettered."
A review of the record does not show any disparity of treatment between the
parties, and shows that each and every one of the judge's rulings were correct under the
circumstances. Again, where Plaintiff has failed to make anything but a superficial argument
about a great number of trial court rulings, the appellate court should consider the matter not
fully briefed by the Plaintiff and not consider the matter. In any event, a thorough review of
the record reveals no prejudice, no error, and no basis for reversal.
V, SINCE THERE WAS NO ERROR ON ANY
OF THE POINTS RAISED BY PLAINTIFF,
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT AMOUNTS TO NOTHING
Plaintiff argues that the cumulative effect of the errors perceived by Plaintiff
warrant a new trial. However, cumulative effect of non-reversible error cannot be found in
this case. As Defendant has shown, the verdict is completely consistent, the voir dire
process was well within the bounds the law has drawn, there was no restricted direct
examination of Plaintiffs expert, and the closing argument of Defendant's counsel was
appropriate. Therefore, because the alleged wrongs were allowable and proper under the
applicable law, there is no cumulative effect mandating reversal.

10

Plaintiff s attorney's other objections appear to challenge the expertise of Mr. Knight. See
e.g.. R. 280 (Vol. II), pp. 370 and 373. Plaintiff has not assigned any error to these rulings.
They were proper in any event as abundant foundation was laid. See R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 362,
and general expertise commencing at R. 280 (Vol. II), p. 356.
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In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), the
court ruled that:
While no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative effect
of the several errors undermines our confidence that defendants were able to
present to the jury their theory of the case and that a fair trial was had.
Id. at 928. There exists no evidence, nor has Plaintiff argued, that any of the court's rulings
disabled the Plaintiff from presenting to the jury her theory of the case. Accordingly, no
prejudice can be shown.
A review of the record shows that both parties were allowed to put on
evidence and bring as many witnesses before the trier of fact as they felt they needed. The
jury instructions reflected the theory of both parties. A review of both parties' expert
witness testimony shows that the court ruled fairly on the objections of both parties. Where
in Whitehead the court found several errors, Plaintiffs alleged errors in this case have no
merit. The cumulative effect amounts to nothing. A fair trial was had. The Plaintiff
presented her theory of the case to the jury and simply failed to persuade the jury of her
position.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of Plaintiffs motion for a new trial and JNOV was
proper. Plaintiff was given a fair trial, and no basis for reversal exists. Accordingly,
Defendant would ask the appellate court to affirm the jury's verdict in this matter and the
trial court's denial of Plaintiffs motion for a new trial.
///
///
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APPENDIX
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(a)
Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves for a directed
verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is
not granted, without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been
made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all
parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any
assent of the jury.
(b)
Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a
directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is
deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by
the motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may
move to have the verdict and nay judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within ten days
after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict.
A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If
a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a
new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was
returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may order a
new trial.
(c)

Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1)
If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for in
subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a
new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is
thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying
the motion for a new trial. If the motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted,
the order thereon does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for
a new trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the
new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the
motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may
assert error in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent
proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not
later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

(d)
Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial
in the event the appellate court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from
determining that the respondent is entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a
new trial shall be granted.
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a)
Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1)
Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
(2)
Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as
a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the
jurors.
(3)
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4)
Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial.
(5)
Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it
is against law.
(7)
Error in law.
(b)
Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days
after the entry of the judgment.
(c)
Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within the which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall
be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d)
On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its
own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a
party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e)
Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment
shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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